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(5) population and geographical requirements.1"5
c. Should the parties seeking incorporation be dissatisfied with
the town supervisor's determination, an appeal may be brought
before a three-judge panel of the appellate division, which panel
will decide whether the town supervisor's findings as to the above
five factors are meritorious.
166
It is hoped that the legislature will recognize the inadequacy
of present legislation, and will move to bridge the gap between the
public policy need for comprehensive planning and the existing
statutory scheme, which grants municipal corporation status irre-
spective of area-wide problems and concerns.
Ricardo H. Piedra
Negation of factors upon which defendant-psychiatrist's judg-
ment was premised is necessary to establish prima facie case of
medical malpractice
The well-settled principle that a physician may not be held
liable for a mere error in medical judgment is circumscribed by a
patient's corresponding right to receive adequate medical treat-
ment.167 Accordingly, should a physician depart from acceptable
161 See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-200 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981-1982).
166 Cf. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 712 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1981-1982) (providing for
appellate division review of the "overall interest" issue in case of deadlock among the gov-
erning boards of local governments affected by a proposed annexation). In its determination
of the Marcus case, special term expressed reservations as to the wisdom of entrusting such
a "far-reaching" decision to the town supervisor, and praised the provision for appellate
division review in annexation proceedings. Marcus v. Baron, 106 Misc. 2d 71, 75, 431
N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1980).
'67 Absent negligence, a physician will not be liable for mere errors of judgment, pro-
vided that he acts in a bona fide manner after careful medical examination. Pike v.
Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898); Paradies v. Benedictine Hosp., 77
App. Div. 2d 757, 759, 431 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (3d Dep't 1980); Cohen v. State, 51 App. Div.
2d 494, 496, 382 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (3d Dep't 1976), afl'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1086, 364 N.E.2d 1134,
396 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); DeFalco v. Long Island College Hosp., 90 Misc. 2d 164, 170, 393
N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977); Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 707-08,
290 N.Y.S.2d 486, 501-02 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Accordingly, a physician will not be held liable for
pursuing an alternative medical procedure which is both proper and acceptable practice.
Henry v. Bronx Lebanon Medical Center, 53 App. Div. 2d 476, 480, 385 N.Y.S.2d 772, 775
(Ist Dep't 1976); Schreiber v. Cestari, 40 App. Div. 2d 1025, 1026, 338 N.Y.S.2d 972, 974 (2d
Dep't 1972); Gielskie v. State, 10 App. Div. 2d 471, 474, 200 N.Y.S.2d 691, 694 (3d Dep't
1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 834, 175 N.E.2d 455, 216 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1961); Hirschberg v. State, 91
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medical practice, thereby causing injury to his patient, the patient
may seek relief pursuant to a malpractice cause of action."" Signif-
icantly, in order to establish a prima facie case of medical malprac-
tice, the plaintiff must produce expert medical testimony in sup-
port of his allegations.169 In this regard, when expert testimony
having a "reasonable degree of medical certainty"17' conflicts at
trial, it is within the province of the jury to assess the credibility of
Misc. 2d 590, 597, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 475 (Ct. Cl. 1977). When, however, the treating physi-
cian is not qualified to make medical judgments, it will constitute more than a mere error
and liability will attach. Cohen v. State, 51 App. Div. 2d 494, 496-97, 382 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129-
30 (3d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1086, 364 N.E.2d 1134, 396 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Hirsch-
berg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 594-95, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see Pigno v.
Bunim, 43 App. Div. 2d 718, 718, 350 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440 (2d Dep't 1973), af'd, 35 N.Y.2d
841, 321 N.E.2d 785, 362 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1974); Mickles v. State, 43 Misc. 2d 953, 957, 252
N.Y.S.2d 629, 633 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
"' Hale v. State, 53 App. Div. 2d 1025, 1025, 386 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (4th Dep't 1976);
Cooper v. Edinbergh, 97 Misc. 2d 143, 145, 410 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1978); Goodman v. Emergency Hosp., 96 Misc. 2d 1116, 1117, 410 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978).
'69 When the alleged act of malpractice is beyond the common knowledge and experi-
ence of the lay jury, expert medical testimony is an essential element of the plaintiff's prima
facie case. McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20, 24, 203 N.E.2d
469, 471-72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69 (1964); Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., Inc., 285 N.Y.
389, 396, 34 N.E.2d 367, 370 (1941); see Koehler v. Schwartz, 48 N.Y.2d 807, 808-09, 399
N.E.2d 1140, 1141, 424 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (1979). The introduction of expert testimony at
trial is necessary to define the physician's duty of care under the circumstances and to de-
termine whether any deviations have resulted in proximate injury to the patient. Brown v.
Goffe, 140 App. Div. 353, 356, 125 N.Y.S. 458, 469 (1st Dep't 1910); Goodman v. Emergency
Hosp., 96 Misc. 2d 1116, 1117-18, 410 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978); Howe
v. State, 33 Misc. 2d 147, 152-53, 226 N.Y.S.2d 933, 939-40 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Moreover, it is
necessary that the physician's act itself reflect improper medical treatment. Hammer v. Ro-
sen, 7 N.Y.2d 376, 380, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1960); Benson v. Dean,
232 N.Y. 52, 56, 133 N.E. 125, 126 (1921); Charlton v. Montefiore Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 153,
157, 256 N.Y.S.2d 219, 223 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965). For the limited contexts in
which the jury in a medical malpractice case is recognized to have the requisite competence
to determine the issue of negligence, see Pipers v. Rosenow, 39 App. Div. 2d 240, 243, 333
N.Y.S.2d 480, 483-84 (2d Dep't 1972).
170 The proper foundation for eliciting expert testimony in a medical malpractice action
is that the expert opinion be stated with a" 'reasonable degree of medical certainty.'" Ulma
v. Yonkers Gen. Hosp., 53 App. Div. 2d 626, 627, 384 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (2d Dep't 1976). But
see DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE RULE OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY: ANALYSIS AND APPLICA-
TION 48-49 (1967) (in some cases the New York courts have accepted expert testimony that
was less than definite). Rule 4515 of the CPLR addresses the question of reasonable medical
certainty:
Unless the court orders otherwise, questions calling for the opinion of an expert
witness need not be hypothetical in form, and the witness may state his opinion
and reasons, without first specifying the data upon which it is based. Upon cross-
examination, he may be required to specify the data and other criteria supporting
the opinion.
CPLR 4515 (1963).
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the expert witnesses and thereby reach a factual determination."'
Recently, however, in Topel v. Long Island Jewish Medical
Center,171 the Court of Appeals deviated from this approach in the
context of malpractice by a psychiatrist, holding that a prima facie
case had not been established when the plaintiff's expert testimony
failed to "negate the factors" upon which the defendant-psychia-
trist had based his medical judgment.173
In Topel, the decedent had been admitted into Long Island
Jewish Medical Center after having exhibited suicidal tenden-
cies.17 4 Upon examination, Dr. Levinson, the hospital's attending
psychiatrist, instructed that the patient be observed at 15-minute
intervals. 75 Shortly thereafter, while left alone in his room, the pa-
tient committed suicide.1 76 During the trial of the ensuing malprac-
tice action,1 7 7 a medical expert testified, on behalf of the plaintiff,
that the physician's failure to keep the patient under constant ob-
servation was a deviation from accepted medical practice. 17 8 Con-
, See Hale v. State, 53 App. Div. 2d 1025, 1025, 386 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (4th Dep't
1976). At trial the weight to be accorded the expert testimony is properly within the prov-
ince of the jury. Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., Inc., 285 N.Y. 389, 398, 34 N.E.2d 367,
371-72 (1941); Hoag v. Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 47, 66 N.E. 579, 582 (1903); Topel v. Long
Island Jewish Medical Center, 76 App. Div. 2d 862, 862, 428 N.Y.S.2d 507, 508 (2d Dep't
1980), afl'd, 55 N.Y.2d 682, 431 N.E.2d 293, 446 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1981); Coates v. Petersen &
Sons, 48 App. Div. 2d 890, 890, 369 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (2d Dep't 1975); Feder v. Port Auth.,
42 App. Div. 2d 602, 603, 345 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (2d Dep't 1973).
172 55 N.Y.2d 682, 431 N.E.2d 293, 446 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1981).
,13 Id. at 684-85, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
174 Id. at 684, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
' ' Id., 431 N.E.2d at 294, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 933. Levinson diagnosed the affliction as
"psychotic depression," while the emergency room physician diagnosed it as "agitated de-
pression." Id. at 686, 431 N.E.2d at 296, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part). At trial, Dr. Levinson testified that, because he believed the patient's condition to be
"life-threatening," he had ordered that the patient be observed at 15-minute intervals. Id.
at 686-87, 431 N.E.2d at 296, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part). There-
after, due to the severity of his condition, the patient was put under constant supervision.
Id. The patient's adverse response to this constant vigil prompted the physician to reinstate
the original 15-minute observation schedule. Id.
176 Id. at 688, 431 N.E.2d at 297, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part). The patient committed suicide by strangulation, using a belt he was permitted to
wear throughout his hospital stay. Id.
177 Id. at 685, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part). The action, on behalf of the deceased patient's widow and children, was brought
against both the hospital and the attending physician. Id. The complaint charged that the
defendant-physician had deviated from sound medical practice when he failed to place the
decedent under constant supervision. Id. at 688, 431 N.E.2d at 297, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 936
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part). As against the hospital, the plaintiff alleged that the staff
had failed to use reasonable care in preventing the patient from committing suicide. Id.
178 A qualified psychiatrist testified on behalf of the plaintiff that the patient was suf-
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trary expert medical testimony was offered 179 and the case was
submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.1 0 Acting upon the defendants' motions, the trial court set
aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint upon the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case. s The
Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously affirmed.182
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum
decision.8 3 Noting that the distinction between professional judg-
ment and good medical practice was not easily discernible, the
Court held that a plaintiff must, through the use of expert testi-
mony, negate the factors upon which a physician's judgment was
made in order to establish a prima facie case of malpractice.1 8' A
contrary holding, the Court posited, would subject every medical
judgment made by a physician to the second-guess of a jury.18 5
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Fuchsberg criticized the Court's
fering from " 'severe psychotic depression'" and presented a "high suicide risk." Id. at 688-
89, 431 N.E.2d at 297, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part).
179 Dr. Levinson testified that in treating the patient he had exercised that degree of
skill possessed by the average physician in his specialty and had used his best judgment in
prescribing the 15-minute intervals of observation. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1979, at 17, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County). He also called an expert witness who substantiated that his treatment
had conformed to good medical practice. Id.
180 55 N.Y.2d at 685, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting
in part).
181 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 8, 1979, at 18, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Queens County). The defendants moved
to set aside the jury verdict as based upon insufficient evidence, and renewed their motions
to dismiss asserting that the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case. In addition,
each defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 4404 to set aside the verdict and to grant a judg-
ment in favor of the defendants as a matter of law. Id. at 17, col. 5. Granting the defen-
dants' motions, the trial court found that the jury's verdict could not have been reached by
any fair reading of the testimony offered by the plaintiff's medical expert. Id. at 18, col. 1.
182 Topel v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 76 App. Div. 2d 862, 862, 428 N.Y.S.2d
507, 508 (2d Dep't 1980). Notably, although the appellate division affirmed the trial court's
determination, it disagreed with the trial judge's analysis of the expert medical testimony
and commented that the weight to be given to such testimony is solely within the province
of the jury. Id.
183 55 N.Y.2d 682, 683, 431 N.E.2d 293, 294, 446 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (1981). Finding no
evidence of a failure to exercise reasonable care, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the
action against the hospital. Id. at 684, 431 N.E.2d at 294, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 933. The Court
based its decision upon the principle that a hospital may not be held liable for merely carry-
ing out the medical treatment ordered by the patient's attending physician. Id.; see Toth v.
Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 265, 239 N.E.2d 368, 374, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440, 449 (1968);
Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 415, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 378
(1967).
184 55 N.Y.2d at 684-85, 431 N.E.2d at 294-95, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 933-34.
185 Id.
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holding as departing from well-established legal doctrine.18 The
dissent contended that the majority improperly had founded its
decision upon an "aberrational" case, Centeno v. City of New
York, 187 in which the appellate division had held that, when there
was conflicting expert testimony as to whether a doctor had exer-
cised proper medical judgment, the plaintiff had failed to present a
prima facie case.188  The dissent observed, moreover, that the
Centeno decision had ignored a line of cases which had recognized
a physician's duty to protect suicidal patients from hurting them-
selves."8 ' Finally, Judge Fuchsberg maintained that a prima facie
case had been established in Topel because the plaintiff had pro-
duced the requisite "quantum" of proof necessary to raise a factual
issue for presentation to the jury.190
It is submitted that the Topel and Centeno decisions were ill-
conceived and were borne of a misplaced, albeit commendable, de-
sire to shield psychiatrists from unfounded malpractice claims.
Concededly, the burgeoning number of such actions almost a dec-
ade ago properly resulted in measures which engender protection
of medical practitioners from onerous malpractice liability and,
concomitantly, restrain rapid increases in malpractice insurance
premiums. 91 Indeed, the legislature responded to the situation by
186 Id. at 685, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part).
187 Id. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part); see Centeno v. City of New York, 48 App.
Div. 2d 812, 369 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1st Dep't 1975), af'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932, 358 N.E.2d 520, 389
N.Y.S.2d 837 (1976).
See 48 App. Div. 2d at 813, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 710-11.
's' 55 N.Y.2d at 696, 431 N.E.2d at 301, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting
in part).
-- Id. at 690, 431 N.E.2d at 298, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 957 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in
part).
'9' Statistics indicate that, in New York State, the number of medical malpractice suits
rose from 407 in 1968 to 773 in 1973, an increase of nearly 90 percent. STATE OF NEW YORK,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 241 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT]. The substantial increase in medical malpractice
claims has been attributed to technological developments, the fragmentation of medical
care, the disintegration of the physician-patient relationship, and the increasing ease of re-
covery. M. SUMNER, THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 12
(1979); see MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra, at 9-10. A medical malpractice "crisis"
surfaced in late 1974 when the Argonaut Insurance Company announced its intention to
raise malpractice insurance premiums by almost 200 percent. T. LOMBARDI, JR., MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 87 (1978). The prompt legislative intervention that ensued
culminated in the enactment of chapter 109 of the New York Session Laws of 1975, which
was "aimed to make malpractice less risky, and consequently less expensive, by reducing
some claimants' rights." MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra, at 31; see Act of May 21,
[Vol. 56:742
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enacting legislation which, inter alia, limits "medical malpractice
action[s] based on lack of informed consent"; 92 reduces the medi-
cal malpractice statute of limitations from 3 years to 2 years and 6
months; 9 3 establishes preferences with respect to court calen-
dars;19 4 and codifies several evidentiary provisions. 95
The above measures, as part of a common legislative scheme,
were better conceived and executed than the Topel rule, and the
Centeno decision upon which it was founded,9 6 for it seems appar-
ent that these two cases effectively and impermissibly forestall jury
consideration of malpractice claims. The Centeno decision largely
undercut the jury function of resolving disputed questions of
fact, 9 7 by not permitting it to resolve a "[d]isagreement between
1975, ch. 109, §§ 1-37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 134.
"' Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 135 (current version at N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1977)). Section 2805-d of the Public Health Law
specifically limits recovery on the basis of informed consent to cases involving nonemer-
gency medical treatment or a diagnostic procedure which invades the integrity of the body.
Id.
"3 Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, § 6, [19751 N.Y. Laws 136 (current version at CPLR
214-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)).
1' Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, § 11, [1975] N.Y. Laws 138 (current version at CPLR
3403(a)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)). This section of chapter 109 was enacted to give
trial preference to medical malpractice suits. Id.
195 E.g., Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, § 9, [1975] N.Y. Laws 137 (current version at
CPLR 4401-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)); Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, § 10, [1975] N.Y.
Laws 137 (current version at CPLR 4010 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)). CPLR 4401-a pro-
vides for a judgment in favor of the defendant-physician, as a matter of law, when the ac-
tion is founded upon a lack of informed consent and the plaintiff has failed to produce
expert medical testimony in support of his position. CPLR 4010 permits the presentation of
evidence to a jury to establish the plaintiff's recovery from collateral sources such as insur-
ance, social security, worker's compensation, and other employee benefit programs.
11" The enactment of the 1975 medical malpractice legislation involved close to 6
months of investigation, negotiation, and debate. See T. LOMBARDI, supra note 191, at 88-97.
Subsequent to its passage, Governor Carey formed the Special Advisory Panel on Medical
Malpractice to examine the entire medical malpractice issue in New York and to monitor
the effectiveness of the recent legislation. Id. at 99-100; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT,
supra note 191, at 1. It is partly for the lack of such monitoring devices and "penchants for
factual investigation and experimentation" in the judiciary that Judge Fuchsberg, in his
dissent, criticized the majority's approach in Topel. 55 N.Y.2d at 695-96, 431 N.E.2d at 301,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting in part).
The United States Constitution provides that "[in suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. Although there
are instances when the distinction is not clear, it is well-established that the court's function
is to decide questions of law, leaving factual determinations to be made by the jury. Balti-
more & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1934); Walker v. New Mexico & S.
Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897). Clearly, "[iut is the exclusive province of the jury. . . to
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professional experts."19 8 Ostensibly, the Centeno Court equates ex-
pert testimony with mere speculative evidence. Surely, such an ap-
proach is improper given that, traditionally, the two concepts have
not been deemed equivalent. While the submission of expert testi-
mony has been held sufficient, indeed necessary, to create a triable
issue of malpractice liability,19 mere speculative evidence has been
held insufficient to make out a prima facie case. 00
pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence in arriving at a factual
determination." 4 B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 29.9, at 308 (6th ed. S. Gard 1972); see
People v. Walker, 198 N.Y. 329, 334, 91 N.E. 806, 808 (1910); W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE §
123, at 97 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
,18 Centeno v. City of New York, 48 App. Div. 2d 812, 813, 369 N.Y.S.2d 710, 710-11
(1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932, 358 N.E.2d 520, 389 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1976). The weight
to be afforded the testimony of an expert witness is properly within the province of the jury.
See notes 171 & 197 and accompanying text supra. Other jurisdictions have held that con-
flicting expert testimony is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice,
raising a factual issue for the jury to resolve. See Phillips v. Stillwell, 55 Ariz. 147, 149-50, 99
P.2d 104, 105 (1940); Sales v. Bacigalupi, 47 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 117 P.2d 399, 402 (Ct. App.
1941); Stohlman v. Davis, 117 Neb. 178, 185-86, 220 N.W. 247, 250-51 (1928). But see Davis
v. Virginia Ry., 361 U.S. 354, 357-58 (1960); Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 Ill. 2d 249, 261-62, 381
N.E.2d 279, 284 (1978); Cable v. Cazayou, 351 So.2d 797, 800 (La. App. 1977); Swope v.
Printz, 468 S.W.2d 34, 40 (Mo. 1971); Kortis v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261, 271-72, 237 N.W.2d
845, 851-52 (1976); Fernandez v. Baruch, 52 N.J. 127, 130-31, 244 A.2d 109, 111 (1968).
19 See, e.g., CPLR 4401-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); note 169 and accompanying
text supra.
200 To ensure that the standard of medical practice to which the expert testifies is accu-
rate, it is necessary that the opinion evidence be based upon material facts contained in the
record or upon information personally known by the witness. Cassano v. Hagstrom, 5
N.Y.2d 643, 646, 159 N.E.2d 348, 349, 187 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1959); Cross v. Board of Educ., 49
App. Div. 2d 67, 70, 371 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (3d Dep't 1975); Cooke v. Bernstein, 45 App. Div.
2d 497, 500, 359 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (1st Dep't 1974); Filanowicz v. Guarino, 27 App. Div. 2d
666, 666-67, 276 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657-58 (2d Dep't 1967). In this regard, the court may deter-
mine that a witness is not qualified to testify as an expert. Meiselman v. Crown Heights
Hosp., Inc., 285 N.Y. 289, 398-99, 34 N.E.2d 367, 372 (1941); Morwin v. Albany Hosp., 7
App. Div. 2d 582, 586, 185 N.Y.S.2d 85, 89 (3d Dep't 1959); DeFalco v. Long Island College
Hosp., 90 Misc. 2d 164, 166, 393 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977). In addi-
tion, a court may rule that a witness' testimony is incredible as a matter of law. W. RICH-
ARDSON, supra note 197, § 123, at 98. Clearly, then, when a verdict of liability is based upon
speculation it cannot stand and a judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Taylor v. City
of Yonkers, 105 N.Y. 202, 209-10, 11 N.E. 642, 644 (1887); Baudenbach v. Schwerdtfeger,
224 App. Div. 314, 318, 230 N.Y.S. 640, 646 (3d Dep't 1928). Absent the presence of mere
speculative expert testimony, however, it is the jury's function to evaluate the experts' cred-
ibility. See notes 171 & 197 and accompanying text supra. In cases involving the conflict of
medical testimony at trial, the conclusion of the jury can be disturbed only if it could not
have been "reached by any fair interpretation of the evidence." Hale v. State, 53 App. Div.
2d 1025, 1025, 386 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (4th Dep't 1976); see Collins v. Wilson, 40 App. Div. 2d
750, 751, 337 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (4th Dep't 1972); cf. Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp.,
292 N.Y. 241, 245, 54 N.E.2d 809, 811 (1944) (in an action to recover on a debt, a court can
set aside a verdict if the evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain it); Bucek v. Meritt, 37
App. Div. 2d 905, 905, 325 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (4th Dep't 1971) (in tort action for injuries
1982] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
A similar infringement upon the province of the jury results
from the Topel holding. By definition, the Court's "negation" stan-
dard amounts to retention, in the bench, of the power to decide the
very essence of a malpractice controversy, namely, whether the de-
fendant-physician's actions deviated from an acceptable standard
of care.201 It seems unclear, therefore, precisely what is left for the
jury to decide. Consequently, it is urged that the Court abandon
the Centeno and Topel rules in favor of the well-settled principle
that a plaintiff who has produced expert medical testimony in
support of his allegations establishes a prima facie case of
malpractice. 20 2
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sustained in an automobile accident, a court may direct a verdict only when there is a legal
insufficiency of evidence to sustain a contrary verdict); Stewart v. R. H. Macy & Co., 55
Misc. 2d 156, 157, 284 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1967) (in negligence
action for personal injuries sustained as a business invitee, a court may set aside the verdict
if it concludes that by no rational basis could the jury have based its verdict on the
evidence).
201 See 55 N.Y.2d at 684-85, 431 N.E.2d at 295, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
202 See note 169 and accompanying text supra. It is further submitted that, at a mini-
mum, the Court should be careful to restrict the Centeno and Topel holdings to instances of
medical malpractice involving psychiatrists. In this regard, it is arguable that the "impre-
cise" nature of psychiatry, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 451, 551 P.2d
334, 353-54, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33-34 (1976) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); People v.
Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 325-27, 535 P.2d 352, 365-66, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501-02 (1975);
Comment, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 406, 409 (1973), justifies
judicial reluctance to send conflicting expert testimony to a jury for resolution of the issue
of psychiatric malpractice, at least with respect to suicidal patients. Of course, in the past,
the New York courts have been willing to find a prima facie case of psychiatric malpractice
when the evidence suggested that the patient's self-inflicted suicidal act was foreseeable and
there was a failure to guard against it. See, e.g., Gries v. Long Island Home, Ltd., 274 App.
Div. 938, 938, 83 N.Y.S.2d 728, 728 (2d Dep't 1948); Robertson v. Charles B. Towns Hosp.,
178 App. Div. 285, 288, 165 N.Y.S. 17, 18-19 (2d Dep't 1917); Robinson v. State, 17 Misc. 2d
775, 777, 187 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Callahan v. State, 179 Misc. 781, 784-85, 40
N.Y.S.2d 109, 112-13 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 1054, 46 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1943). Recogniz-
ing, however, that "[a]n ingenious patient harboring a steady purpose to take his own life
cannot always be thwarted," the courts have been reluctant to require 24-hour supervision.
Hirsch v. State, 8 N.Y.2d 125, 127, 168 N.E.2d 372, 373, 202 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (1960); Co-
miskey v. State, 71 App. Div. 2d 699, 699, 418 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (3d Dep't 1979); Fernandez
v. State, 45 App. Div. 2d 125, 126, 356 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709-10 (3d Dep't 1974). Moreover, the
courts have hesitated to hold a physician liable upon the claim that a patient's suicide was
due to his premature release from a hospital or institution, and have reasoned that the
imposition of liability under these circumstances would result in few patients being dis-
charged from mental institutions. See Fiederlein v. City of New York Health & Hosps.
Corp., 80 App. Div. 2d 821, 822, 437 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1st Dep't 1981); Centeno v. City of
New York, 48 App. Div. 2d 812, 813, 369 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40
N.Y.2d 932, 358 N.E.2d 520, 389 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1976); Taig v. State, 19 App. Div. 2d 182,
183, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (3d Dep't 1963).
